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IS THE SEVENTEENTH ARTICLE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
P.ENNbYLVANIA SELF-ENFORCING? In our last issue we stated in
a note under this title that "A bill in equity was filed in the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas by the Harrisburg
Rolling Mill Company against the Pennsylvania Railroad Com-
pany, because of a breach of one of the sections of the article in
question. Judge Simonton, in his opinion, declared this article to
be self-enforcing; that regardless of the lack of legislation in con-
formity with the twelfth section, nevertheless a breach of any pro-
vision of the first eleven sections will of itself be sufficient cause for
the courts to lay hold of the offending corporation."
The above statement was more sweeping than the facts of the
case referred to warranted. The suit was brought for a breach of
the last clause of section three of the seventeenth article, which
ordains that 'persons and property transported over any railroad
shall be delivered at any station at charges not exceeding the
charges for transportation of persons and property of the same
class in the same direction to any more distant point." Judge
Simonton's decision was that this clause needed no legislation to
enforce it. The decision, we feel, is a good one, and hope that
the principle may in time be applied to all the sections of the
article.
UNAUTHORIZED RAILWAY LEASES: CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY V. PULLMAN'S PALACE CAR COMPIANY. The Circuit
Court of the United States, sitting in the Eastern District of
201
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Pennsylvania, has recently dismissed the exceptions filed by both
parties to the report of the Master, Theodore M. Etting, Esq., to
whom the court had confided the duty of ascertaining the amount
of compensation due by the Pullman's Palace Car Company to the
Central Transportation Company for the use and enjoyment of
property under an unauthorized lease. It will be remembered
that the Central Transportation Company, a corporation chartered
under the "manufacturing corporation law" of Pennsylvania,
made a lease of its cars, contracts and patent rights to the Pull-
man's Palace Car Company on February 17, 1870. The lessee
entered into possession of the property and used it for many years,
paying a large annual rental to the lessor. The lessee, however,
refused to pay the rental due for the first two quarters of the year
1885, and an action of covenant was begun in the Circuit Court
for the purpose of recovering the arrearage. In this action, the
objection that the contract sued on was u/tra z'ires was not pleaded.
The plaintiff obtained a verdict, but on appeal to the Supreme
Court, the judgment of the court below was reversed on account of
the erroneous exclusion of certain evidence affecting the amount
which the plaintiff by the terms of the original lease was entitled
to recover: 139 U. S. 62. While this suit was pending, another
action of covenant had been instituted to recover rental for the
year ending July i, 1886. In this suit, the defendant pleaded
(inter alia) that the indenture of lease was void in law for
want of authority and corporate power to make and enter into
it. No question was raised as to the power of the lessee
to accept the lease, but it was urged that the Act of the Pennsyl-
vania Legislature of February 9, 187o, prepared by counsel for the
purpose of authorizing the lease in question, and passed by the
Legislature with that end in view, was in law an insufficient warrant
to the plaintiff to divest itself of the means of performing its "public
duties." In order to support the averment that it had public
duties to perform, recourse was had to the argument that the
plaintiff, though originally chartered under the general law, as
was the case with thousands of other corporations in Pennsylvania,
had become a quasi-public corporation in virtue of the Act which
assumed to confer upon it authority to make the lease in suit,
extended the term of its corporate existence and authorized an
increase of its capital stock. The contention was then made that
as the corporation was a quasi-public corporation, and as the
authority to lease was insufficient, the contract was to be treated
as void, and recovery upon it must be denied. The court below
sustained the defendant's contention, and, on appeal to the
Supreme Court, the judgment of the court below was affirmed,
Mr. Justice Gray delivering the opinion : 139 U. S. 24.
While the second suit was pending, the Pullman's Palace Car
Company filed in the Circuit Court a bill to enjoin the further
prosecution of the action on the ground: (i) that under an agrce-
ment between the parties, the lessee had become entitled to sur-
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render the lease; (2) that the property covered by the lease had
become so mingled and identified with the lessee's business that it
was impossible to restore the cars and equipment, and to re-assign
the contracts, and that equitable relief was needed to determine the
amount of compensation due; (3) that the lease was invalid, and
that, therefore, there was no liability upon the part of the lessee
except to return the property capble of xeturn, and to make com-
pensation for its use. The court refused to interfere, however, on
the ground that the legality of the lease could be tried as well at
law as in equity. The decision of the court upon this point seems-
to have been unquestionably correct. The validity of a corporate
contract is eminently a question for a court of law to pass upon.
It is interesting to observe that in Beman v. Rufiford, i Simons,
N. S. 550 (851), Lord Cranworth, sitting in equity, refused to pass
upon the validity of an unauthorized railway lease, and he merely
granted an interim injunction, directing that a case be stated for the
opinion of a court of law upon the point.
After the decision in the Supreme Court, the Pullman's Company
moved for leave to discontinue the suit in equity, while the defend-
ant moved for leave to file a cross-bill for a return of the property,
or for compensation. The former motion was refused, and the
latter was granted. The cross-bill was filed, and the right of the
lessor to affirmative relief was vindicated by the court. "The fol-
lowing propositions respecting such contracts," said Butler, J.,
- may be affirmed with confidence: First, that the courts will not
enforce them ; second, that the courts will not interfere for the
relief of either party when they are executed; third, that the
courts will interfere to compel restitution of property received
under such a contract by one who repudiates it-except when the
contract involves moral turpitude." This contract involved no
moral turpitude. Both parties acted in good faith upon the belief
that the contract was lawful. It was the case of a difference of
opinion between court and counsel. The right to restitution was
admitted in the original bill-but independently of the admis-
sion was to be treated as established upon the basis of many
authorities, among which the court laid special emphasis on
Thomas v. Richnond, 12 Wall. 349 (i88o), and Sring Compa0 v.
Kno'llton, 103 U. S. 49 (870). The Pullman's Companycannot be
heard to assert that this lease was to the disadvantage of the public,
and the lessor is entitled to recover back property parted with
under it. " It would be difficult to state a case more completely
within the principle invoked than the one before us. . . . The
property must, therefore, be returned or paid for. The former is
impossilfle. The property has substantially disappeared. It has
become incorporated with the business and property of the plain-
tiff, and cannot be separated. Compensation must, therefore, be
made. What, then, is the measure of compensation? Clearly,
we think, the value of the property when received, together with
its earnings since, less the amount paid as rent: " 65 Fed. Rep. i58.-
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In applying the principle of compensation as above laid down,
the Master has considered several measures of value with respect to
the property transferred under the lease, "none of which can be
said to be absolutely accurate, but all of which serve to check or
verify each other." He has placed most weight upon the earning
capacity of the plant at the time of the lease, and, as a test of this
capacity, he has accepted the average market value of the capital
stock at the time of the transfer. The lessor before being charged
with rent received, however, was entitled to a credit under the
opinion of the court, for the earnings of the property. The Master
had found that an accurate ascertainment of the earnings without
further evidence than that which was produced before him was
impossible-and upon this point suggested that further testimony
be taken. The court, howewer, seems to have cut the Gordian
knot by making a decree for the payment of the value of the
property when transferred with interest thereon to -date-less the
amount paid as rental.
When the litigation ends, it will be interesting to compare the
final result with the result that would have been reached had a
recovery been permitted in the first instance upon the contract.
Since these long leases are in effect sales, and since at their expira-
tion nothing is expected to be left of the demised property, such a
decree as the one just entered will make ulra vires leases profitable
for the lessors in every case where the sum of rentals for the
unexpired term is less than the estimated value of the property.
This result cannot long stand unchallenged. At present, it
must suffice to venture the suggestion that the learned opin-
ion of the Circuit Court has not made the preliminary question
of the lessor's right to affirmative relief entirely clear. Certainly
Sjring Compan" v. Knouwlton, sipra, is not in point, for in that
case the party seeking relief was the party who had elected to dis-
affirm the invalid contract. Thomas v. Richmond. supiw, is not
an authority in favor of the lessor's right. In that case, both
parties made a contract in violation of a statutory prohibition, and
found themselves in consequence in pani delito. The statute was
passed to emphasize a theory of public expediency. The contract
was, in no sense, an immoral contract. The plaintiff's right to
recover in quasi-contract was denied. It is submitted that if the
lease in the present case had been a contract between individuals,
and had been void as against public policy, the lessor would not
have been entitled to affirmative relief. The result reached by the
court, therefore, involves a decision that corporations stand upon
a different footing from individuals in this respect. If this is so,
must it not be conceded that the conclusion reached by the Circuit
Court (however sound it may be) is without support from the
authorities cited by Judge Butler or from any other authorities to
be found in the books? See Recent Developimenl of Coporation
Lawu in the Sitp-eme Court of tihe United Sates, 34 AMERICAN L'AW
REG. & REV., N. S. 296.
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MEC- %xics' LIEx.. A recent case, Brt/on v. Ralph, 42 N. E.
644 (1896), while voicing the position of the highest court of
Indiana upon the liability of the land, upon which any building
subject to a mechanic's lien has been destroyed, to satisfy the claims
of the lienor, does not, in any sense, lessen the cQnflict which exists
upon the question, or supply any means upon which a true rule may
be evolved. In this case, a sub-contractor sought to foreclose a
mechanic's lien upon the appellant's land for *'ork done and
materials furnished in plastering a house in process of erection
thereon. Before its completion and before the notice of the lien
was filed the building was destroyed by fire, and the question was
presented to the court, whether the right to the lien was lost with
the building or continued against the land. The statute which
secured to mechanics the right to look to the building, upon which
their labor and materials were directed, for their remuneration in
this instance provided that "the entire land upon which any build-
ing, erection or other improvement is situated, including the por-
tion not covered therewith, shall be subject to the lien : " Rev. St.
1894, § 7256 : and the court allowed the lienor to foreclose his
lien and obtain satisfaction from the land, after the building had
been demolished, upon the ground that the general purpose of
the legislature in passing the statute was to protect laborers and
material-men, and the lien should, therefore, apply to the land
directly, if a recovery from the building itself should become
impossible.
As to the question here at issue, the authorities are at variance..
Pennsylvania early led off with the holding that the lien was given
largely because the land was benefited by the erection of the build-
ing, and the lien on the building was the principal thing, while
that on the land was merely the incident, it being superadded by
legislature because it was essential to a full enforcement of the
lien against the building which had become attached to and part of
the realty. Therefore, it was held, that with the destruction of the
building the lien on the land was lost. This holding was also
deemed more politic, as favoring future improvements. The Act
of 1836 (P. L. 696), here referred to, is not materially different
from the one in Indiana in question. It extended the lien to the
ground covered by the building, and to so much other ground
immediately adjacent thereto and belonging to the same owner as
may be necessary for the ordinary and usual purposes of such
building : and in constructing this statute the court has repeatedly
held that the lien shares the fate of the building, and with the
destruction of the latter the reason for binding the land ceases:
Church v. S1e'l/er, 26 Pa. 246 (1856) ; al,-on's Appeal, 28 Pa.
161 (857) Lind,,l S/rT Co. v. il/anufac/luring Co., 158 Pa.
246 (1893). This view is sustained by Coellii Ion v. DTh Dock
CGO, 31 N. J. L. 477 (1865) ; Goyt/man v. Baei-locker, 6o N. W.
415, (Wis.) 1894 ; Schillra1fi v. Ruek, 6 Daly 1 (1875) ; Shines
Ex. v. Heinburger, 6o Mo. App. 174 (1894) ; Tunis v. Park
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Asso'n, 33 Pac. Rep. 63 (Cal.) (1893); and see Houck on
Liens, 5203.
Other courts have been disposed to construe the law liberally in
favor of the mechanics and material-men, and to subject the land,
after the destruction of the building, to their liens: Z-eeman v.
Getchell, 27 Minn. 516 (1881) ; Clairk v. Powell, 58 Iowa, 509
(1882) ; Steigleman v. AcBride, 17 Ill. 300 (1855). In most, if
not indeed in all, of this latter class of cases, it may be admitted
that the statutes reserving the right of lien are quite capable of the
interpretation placed upon them by the courts, if one is prepared
to adopt the rule of construction which is applied, by them. While
no entirely harmonious rule may be possible, inasmuch as the right
of lien in each State is dependent upon distinct legislative enact-
ments, yet since the general object of such acts is the same, and,
as the cases admit, the statutes are, in fact, conflicting in no mate-
rial particulars, one would suppose that in such a case as the one
presented the courts would reach similar results. That, under such
circumstances, one class of cases should present a conclusion diamet-
rically opposed to that reached in other jurisdictions, would seem
to indicate that a different rule of construction had been applied.
Such, indeed, is the case. Those courts which follow the reasoning
in the principal case, overlooking the fact that the statutes creating
the right of lien are, in the main, mere arbitrary legislative enact-
ments, which give to one an interest and a right in the property of
another, which did not exist at the Common Law, adopt a liberal
interpretation. They observe that the legislative interest was to
aid and protect laborers and material-men, and proceed to con-
strue the statutes accordingly, thereby departing from the cardinal
principle of statutory construction that such enactments must be
interpreted with strictness, inasmuch as by them new rights affect-
ing the property interest of others are created. It seems difficult,
therefore, to reconcile the conclusion of the leading case with prin-
ciples so long acknowledged and adhered to, and one is inclined
to adopt the reasoning of the Pennsylvania court and those that fol-
low its conclusions.
CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. A decision
by one of the district courts of California, delivered on the third of
last January, brings to the consideration of the legal profession a
question not only of great importance, but one also of much nicety.
One Wong Kim Ark was born in 1873, in the State of California,
of parents who, though at that time residents here, were subjects.
of the Emperor of China. His parents continued to reside here
until i89o, when they took permanent leave. Wong Kim Ark
remained in the United States until 1894, when he departed on a
temporary visit to the land of his race. In August, 1895, he
returned, and applied to the Collector of the Port to be permitted
to land, and his application was refused upon the sole ground that
he was not a citizen of this country. Upon this refusal, a petition
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for a writ of habeas ewpius was filed for him in the district court,
where it was held by Morrow, J., that. having been born here, he
was, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, a natural-born American citizen, and was being
unjustly restrained of his right to return to this country.
The said Amendment provides: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside."
It is unquestioned that this declaration is decisive of the question
of what constitutes citizenship, but the difficulty arises in determin-
ing the import of the words "and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof;" whether, by them. it is meant the mere obligation of
obedience to her laws, or subject in a broader sense to her political
jurisdiction.
At Common Law. if the parent be under the actual obedience of
the king, and the place of the child's birth be within the king's
obedience, as well as in his dominion, the child becomes a subject
of the realm. But, by International Law, birth follows the political
status of the father. and of the mother when the child is illegitimate.
So that it is quite evident that the proper solution of the difficulty
rests upon the discernment of the true scope of the meaning of the
word jurisdiction as it appears in the Constitution in the clause
referred to.
This case is not altogether a new one, but has been previously
decided in three cases in inferior courts: Lrni v. Clark, I Sandf.
Ch. (N. Y.) 583 (1844) ; Gee Fook Si gv. CUnited States, 49 Fed.
Rep. 146 (1892) In -reLook Till Sing, 21 Fed. Rep. 905 (1884) ;
in the last of which the opinion was rendered by the present Justice
Field of the Supreme Court, all three adopting the Common Law
rule, viz., that birth within the realm is conclusive. The ques-
tion seems never to have been before the Supreme Court of the
United States for decision. It has, however, been incidentally
there, and in one case, Jfinoar v. appersett, 2 Wall. i68 (1874),
they refused to decide the point, and in another, The S/afghfer-
H-louse Cases, 16 Wall. 73 (1872), they, by a dictum, construe
the clause in direct conflict with the decision of Field, J., when
in the lower court. It is worthy of note that Justice Field dissents
in the latter case.
It is unquestionably the function of the courts to interpret this
language, but in doing so it seems that they are not called upon to
impute to the States an intention which might very probably
involve the Government in serious complications with foreign
powers, especially when the alternative construction is in equal
probability the one intended, and by far the more logical. If
Chinamen born here of resident parents. are citizens, the same is
true of those born of parents casually here with no intention of
remaining, and the United States are bound to protect them wher-
ever they go. Now, since the United States also claims as citizens
children born abroad of parents who are citizens of this country,
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they cannot deny the same right to any foreign state. including
China. So that we have the case of persons owing allegiance to,
and entitled to, the protection of different, and it may be hostile,
countries. Surely such a circumstance cannot but be productive
of embarrassment some time in the future.
Mr. George D. Collins, of the San Francisco bar. has ablh advo-
cated the adoption of the International rule of citizenhi I, in two
articles in the American law Re7'icz : 18 American L. Rev. b31
(1884) 20 Id. 385 ( 1895), in which he expresses the hope that
an occasion lnaN soon arise for presenting the question to our
Supreme Court for determination. In view of his interest in the
point, he was associated with the Attorney-General in the present
case as a'nicits curie. There is an intimation in the opinion of
Morrow, J., that the decision was contrary to Mr. Collins' conten-
tion because of the previous binding decisions, for he says: " The
doctrine of the law of nations . . . is undoubtedly more logical,
reasonable, and satisfactory, but this consideration "-ill not justify
this court in declaring it to be the law against controlling judicial
authority."
In view, then, of the fact that thousands of this race are now, if
the above decision is wrong, improperly exercising the political
franchise, and of the other still greater objection mentioned, it is to
be hoped that this case be appealed to the Supreme Court for its
solution.
EXTENSION OF LIABIILITY FOR N,'EGLIGENCE. In the case of Lezeis
v. Terry, (Cal.) 43 Pac. Rep. 398 (i896), there is an extension
of the liability of the vendor of an article for injuries resulting
therefrom to third persons. The defendants. fiurniture dealers.
sold a defectively constructed folding-bed, knowing it to be danger-
ous, but representing it to be safe. The plaintiff, a lodger in the
house of the vendee, having been injured by reason of the latent
defect in the bed, brought an action of tort against the vendor.
The Supreme Court of California held that a demurrer to the comi-
plaint should have been overruled, the absence of contractual rela-
tion between the parties to the suit being immaterial.
This seems to be a strong application of the doctrine enunicated
in prior American cases, that a person who, in dealing with inher-
ently dangerous articles, negligently or wilfully puts in circulation
one in which there is a latent defect or source of peril, threatening
great bodily harm to the public, is liable for injuries resulting from
his action, independent of any relation of contract. The cases
have dealt mostly with injuries occasioned by fire-arms, ex-plosives
and dangerous drugs, in handling which there is a duty of consum-
mate care: e. ., Thomas v. If Dinccs/e , 6 N. V. 397 i852 I.
where a recovery was allowed for the negligent sale of a poisonous
drug, whereby one, not a party to the contract, was made seri-
ously ill. The California case extends this general liability to the
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vendor of an article not inherently dangerous but dangerous
because of a defect in construction of which he is aware.
The English cases have not laid down so broad a rule, but have,
usually, based a recovery on some contractual or similar relation
between the parties litigant, sufficient to charge the defendant with
fraud and deceit in selling the article. The limitation is apparent
in Langri,4'-e v. Lezi', 2 'M. & W. 519 (1.837) ; and ;George v '
Skiington, L. R. 5 Ex. i (1869). But a broader principle might
well have been enunciated in these cases had the courts been will-
ing to give full effect to the precedent in Dixon v. Bell, 5 1 & S.
198 (i816), where the owner was held liable for injuries resulting
to a stranger from the accidental discharge of a gun in the hands
of an incompetent person, on the ground that he should have ren-
dered it incapable of doing mischief before entrusting it to such
care.
